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Great Ape Personhood 
 
Justin Fox 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Every movement in favor of protecting animals, sheathed under the broad 
umbrella of anti-cruelty measures, invariably invokes the notion that we ought to be 
“humane” towards animals. Our language gives away the core of the issue: that ethical 
treatment is determined in relation to humanity.  This paper proposes a limited expansion 
of that concept.  Great apes should be recognized as having a limited form of personhood 
akin to that of the cognitively challenged. To achieve that objective, those of us who 
advocate great ape personhood should primarily pursue a legislative strategy on the state 
level that seeks to grant legal standing to great apes. Great apes are defined as members 
of the class of hominidea, consisting of chimpanzees, orangutans, gorillas, bonobos, and 
humans.
1
  By according rights to our nearest biological relative on basis of their superior 
intellect, we will begin to transform the concept of personhood.   
Prior to this writing, all fifty states have enacted anti-cruelty statutes.
2
  
Nevertheless, a major impediment to the realization of rights for great apes thus far has 
been their categorization as property.
3
 Because they are defined as property, great apes 
are incapable of recognizing any genuine recourse for harms done to them.
4
  Recognizing 
personhood for apes would allow them a genuine path of recourse, by functionally 
                                                        
1
 Lee Hall and Anthony Waters, From Property to Person: The Case of Evelyn Hart, 11 Seton Hall Const. 
L.J. 1, 1-3 (2000). 
2
 Statutes/laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CENTER, 
http://www.animallaw.info/statutes/topicstatutes/sttoac.htm  (last visited April 15, 2012).  The author 
would like to point out that this is the best database of state anti-cruelty statutes he found in his research. 
3
 Carole Lynn Nowicki, The Animal Welfare Act: All Bark and No Bite, 23 Seton Hall Legis. J. 443, 447-
448 (1999).  
4
 Hall and Waters supra note 1. 
 2 
conferring personhood.
5
 This would thereby allow advocates to work within the existing 
legal system to achieve a more equitable existence for great apes. While this may seem 
far-fetched, there have been incidents where animals have been named as plaintiffs and, 
importantly, there exists a centuries-old structure for conducting these cases.
6
   
While this question presents a plethora of moral, ethical, political, economic and 
other issues, this paper will limit its inquiry to the issue of great ape personhood, though 
it is necessarily grounded in earlier general animal anti-cruelty efforts. This paper will 
explore various existing approaches towards expanding and transforming the concept of 
personhood by expanding legal recognition of great apes.  Advocates of great ape 
personhood should focus on progressive legislation at the state level and allow for federal 
impact litigation as a dual-pronged approach to advancing the cause of great apes.  This 
paper will take into account applicable international, national, and state law, in addition 
to scientific and historic evidence tending towards the recognition of animal personhood.  
II. Background 
 
A. A Brief History of the Progress from General Animal Rights Advocacy to 
Great Ape Personhood  
 
There is a widespread notion that the accordance of limited personhood to great 
apes will act as a beachhead in expanding animal rights.
7
  The question of great ape 
                                                        
5
 Limited personhood does not include the full bundle of rights associated with personhood, but it would 
confer the vital property of standing, thereby creating the necessary legal infrastructure for great apes to 
establish and enforce the integrity of their own rights with the help of interested guardians.  For a lengthier 
philosophical discussion of the “form” of personhood, the author submits Judith Butler.  Judith Butler, 
Appearances Aside, 88 Calif. L. Rev. 55. (2000). 
6
 E.P. Evans, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF ANIMALs 310 (1906). 
7
 Wesley J. Smith, Transhumanists Launch Campaign for Animal Personhood, SECONDHAND SMOKE 
(Sunday, February 13, 2011, 6:39 PM) 
http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/secondhandsmoke/2011/02/13/transhumanists-launch-campaign-for-
animal-personhood/. 
 3 
personhood and associated rights expansion is linked inexorably to the question of 
general animal welfare.  Jeremy Bentham is oft cited as starting the modern conversation 
on animal rights.
8
 Bentham drew a distinction based on whether or not the creature in 
question was capable of suffering (“the insuperable line”): 
What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it 
the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? 
But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more 
rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an 
infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But 
suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The 
question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, 
Can they suffer? 
9
 
The question remains hotly debated, but it seems that some consensus, at least among 
most philosophers and scientists, has formed against the infliction of needless pain at 
least to the higher species of animals.
10
   
 Peter Singer has been one of the foremost proponents of expanding animal rights.   
Starting with the 1975 publication of “Animal Liberation”, Singer has raised awareness 
of the abuses faced by animals in modern society.
11
 Singer initially focused on the issue 
of animal cruelty, shedding light on mainstream scientific testing practices that subject 
animals to extremely painful conditions.
12
  Building on Bentham, Singer’s work has 
focused on the utility of animal life while still aiming to curtail the most extreme, painful, 
                                                        
8
 PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 7 (1st ed. 1975).  Singer’s work is deeply connected to and grounded 
in Jeremy Bentham’s construction of utilitarianism.  Bentham explored the cognitive ability of fully 
developed animals in relation to babies, in addition to their capacity for pain (“the insuperable line”) , in 
considering humanity’s treatment of animals. The author strongly suggests reading Bentham for a better 
understanding of the origins and underpinnings of modern animal welfare philosophy. Bentham considered 
the cognitive ability   See Bentham infra note 8.   
9
 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 283 (J.H. Burns 
& H.L.A. Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1789).  
10
 Animal Cruelty Facts and Statistics, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_neglect/facts/animal_cruelty_facts_statistics.html#Legislative
_Trends (last visited April 1, 2012).  Per the Humane Society, 47 of 50 states have felony anti-cruelty 
statutes.   
11
 Adam Kolber, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes, 54 Stan. L. 
Rev. 163, 167 (2001). 
12
 See generally Singer note 7. 
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and harmful practices animals are subjected to.
13
  Singer advocates a progressive 
approach that builds within existing legal infrastructure, seeking to expand animal rights 
without radically altering human exceptionalism.
14
 
As Singer’s renown grew, he eventually channeled his energies into helping to 
found the Great Ape Project.
15
  The Great Ape Project began with the publication of an 
eponymous book containing “A Declaration of the Great Apes”, which seeks to establish 
“certain basic moral and legal rights for great apes.”16  “The Declaration highlights three 
principles to protect great apes. They include a right to life, a right to be free from 
unlawful confinement, and a general prohibition on torture.“ 17 The Great Ape Project 
describes itself as an organization that “aims to defend the rights of the non-human great 
primates - chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans and bonobos, our closest relatives in the 
animal kingdom.”18 The goal of the Great Ape Project is to have the United Nations pass 
a declaration expanding personhood to include apes, thereby recognizing their rights 
legally and socially.
19
   
While the Great Ape Project has done a great deal to advance and expand our 
                                                        
13
 Martha Nussbaum, Book Review: Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis 
114 Harv. L. Rev. 1506, 1529 (2001). (reviewing STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL 
RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS.) 
14
  Ruth Payne, Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, and the Path to Social Reform: One Movement's Struggle 
for Coherency in the Quest for Change, 9 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 587, 594-595 (2002).  It is important to 
note that there is a significant fracture within the animal welfare and advocacy community on this point. 
Rutgers Law Professor Francione argues that animals should be accorded full equality with humans, 
whereas Singer advocates a limited grant of rights.  While this dispute is largely beyond the scope of this 
paper, it is important to recognize because it represents a major schism in the animal rights community.  
However, as this paper is concerned with the legal approach and effect of a gradualist approach in keeping 
with the work of Singer and other like-minded intellectuals, it is beyond the scope of this paper to delve 
further into this conversation.  additionally, see generally Gary L. Francione, ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE 
ABOLITIONIST APPROACH, http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/ (last visited April 15, 2012).  
15
 History, THE GREAT APE PROJECT, http://www.greatapeproject.org/en-US/oprojetogap/Historia (last 
visited April 17, 2012). 
16
 Kolber Kolber supra note 11 at 178. 
17
  Id. at 179. 
18
 THE GREAT APE PROJECT, http://www.greatapeproject.org/en-US (last visited April 17, 2012). 
19
 THE GREAT APE PROJECT 4-7 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993). 
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understanding of personhood and the capacity for it, Professor Francione of Rutgers Law 
School argues that, morally, the Great Ape Project stands on shaky ground because it 
reinforces anthropocentrism:  
We proclaim human intelligence to be morally valuable per 
se because we are human. If we were birds, we would 
proclaim the ability to fly as morally valuable per se. If we 
were fish, we would proclaim the ability to live underwater 
as morally valuable per se. But apart from our obviously 
self-interested proclamations, there is nothing morally 
valuable per se about human intelligence.
20
   
However, Great Ape Project co-founder Paola Cavalieri has described the Project as an 
essentially gradualist approach, as it seeks to break the “barrier” separating humans from 
non-humans by focusing on the “grey zone” created by non-human primates who can 
communicate with us in human language.
21
  “Reformers can only start from a given 
situation, and work from there; once they have made some gains, their next starting-point 
will be a little further advanced, and when they are strong enough they can bring pressure 
to bear from that point.”22  
 The founders of the Great Ape Project aim towards a gradualist yet transformative 
approach in expanding the spectrum of animal rights, using great apes as a vehicle for an 
                                                        
20
 Gary L. Francione, A Note On Humanlike Intelligence and Moral Value, ANIMAL RIGHTS: THE 
ABOLITIONIST APPROACH http://www.abolitionistapproach.com/a-note-on-humanlike-intelligence-and-
moral-value/ (last visited April 15, 2012).   Francione has written at length about “full equality” for animals 
and an abolition of their status as property.  This is reflective of that approach insofar as it demonstrates the 
essential anthropocentrism that is central to the Great Ape Project.  In Francione’s view, great ape 
advocates are promoting human exceptionalism and anthropocentrism by explicitly promoting humanity’s 
closest relative. Even if the approach embraces transhuman rights, its gradualist approach is, in Francione’s 
view, largely continuing and promoting the current hierarchy.  
21
 Cavalieri supra note 19 at 304-312 THE GREAT APE PROJECT 304-312 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer 
eds., 1993). 
22
 Id.  
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initial expansion of rights.
23
  Paola Cavalieri has said that the “radical enfranchisement” 
of great apes will significant for “its symbolic value as a concrete representation of the 
first breach in the species barrier.”24 Likewise, co-founder Peter Singer has declared, 
“there is no sound moral reason why possession of basic rights should be limited to 
members of a particular species…. At a minimum, we should recognize basic rights in all 
beings who show intelligence and awareness (including some level of self-awareness) 
and who have emotional and social needs.”25 This gets to the core of Singer’s philosophy 
and the Great Ape Project: to begin to legally and culturally recognize the inherent self-
interest of other self-aware beings, focusing initially on the compelling cause of great 
apes, however gradual the initial steps may be. Opinions regarding animal 
enfranchisement are diffuse, and the distinctions between rights and welfare are 
contentious.
26
 However, Cavalieri maintains that affording basic rights to great apes 
widens the possibility of granting limited rights to members of other species in 
accordance with their needs and capabilities.
27
  
B. Why Apes? 
Great apes are our closest biological relatives in the animal kingdom.
28
  Great 
apes are defined as chimpanzees, gorillas, bonobos (sometimes known as “pygmy 
chimpanzees”), orangutans, and humans, forming a class known scientifically as 
“hominidea.”29 We share 99.4% of our DNA with chimpanzees, a figure so astounding as 
                                                        
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Peter Singer, The great ape debate unfolds in Europe, JAPAN TIMES, (May 22, 2006). 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20060522a1.html. 
26
 Payne supra note 14. 
27
 Cavalieri supra note 19.  
28
 Hall supra note 1 at 1-2.  
29
Id. 
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to have led some scientists to identify chimpanzees as being human.
30
  Human 
understanding of chimpanzees in particular has advanced dramatically in recent 
decades.
31
  Consequently, it is now widely understood that apes have shown the ability to 
perform acts of higher cognition, including the ability to master language.
32
  Dr. Jane 
Goodall, who has dedicated her life to the study of great apes, argues that it is the 
incredible behavioral similarity between humans and great apes that makes them 
exceptional.
33
  Steven Wise asserts, “the power of the arguments for basic liberty rights 
for great apes is illuminated by the incredible mental and cognitive abilities of 
chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and gorillas.”34  It is precisely because great apes are 
the most human-like and intelligent of all animals other than humans that they are 
championed for personhood. Granting limited personhood to great apes embraces our 
nearest relative in a way that simultaneously recognizes their capacity for higher 
cognition while maintaining our existing hierarchy and human exceptionalism.
35
 
 
                                                        
30
 Jeff Hecht, Chimps are Human, Gene Study Implies, NEW SCIENTIST (May 19, 2003) 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn3744  “The new study found that 99.4 percent of the most critical 
DNA sites are identical in the corresponding human and chimp genes. With that close a relationship, the 
two living chimp species belong in the genus Homo, says Morris Goodman of Wayne State University in 
Detroit.“  
31
 Steven M. Wise, The Entitlement Of Chimpanzees To The Common Law Writs Of Habeas Corpus And 
De Homine Replegiando, 37 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 219, 225 (2007). 
32
 Katrina L. Schrengost, Cultivating Compassionate Law: Unlocking the Laboratory Door and Shining 
Light on the Inadequacies & Contradictions of the Animal Welfare Act, 33 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 855, 866 
(2011). Stories of apes mastering sign language are plentiful in the modern conscience, most famously 
including Koko the gorilla.  Koko seems to have learned to communicate in American Sign Language, and  
she has communicated emotively and rationally with her caretakers.  This has generated considerable press, 
and generated at least some discussion of what it means to participant in society. Through sign language, 
Koko has demonstrated an ability to convey emotions such as sadness at death and a sense of humor.9 
http://www.straightdope.com/columns/read/2443/are-gorillas-using-sign-language-really-communicating-
with-humans 
33
 Symposium, Ten Years of Animal Law at Lewis & Clark Law School: Remarks: The Evolving Legal 
Status of Chimpanzees, 9 Animal L. 1, 3-4 (2003). 
34
 Id. at 30 
35
 Kolber supra note 11 at 168-170.  Human exceptionalism here refers to the notion that humans are 
significant among all other animals based on their innate capabilities, chief among them cognitive capacity.   
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C. A Brief History of Animal Trials 
The concept of animal standing is nothing new; animal trials were conducted 
during the medieval and early modern periods.
36
 These trials create a template that can be 
used to model a modern form of animal standing.
37
  As discussed below, granting 
standing recognizes the inherent self-interest animals have as members of society and 
enfranchisement enables participation within existing societal norms for the redress of 
grievances.
38
  These animal trials demonstrate societal recognition of animal self-interest 
and acknowledge the rights thereby associated with some form of personhood.
39
 
During such trials, animals were held responsible, furnished with counsel, and 
punished – but virtually all were convicted.40  In his classic treatment on the topic, E.P. 
Evans described an example of a trial:  
On the 5th of September, 1379, as two herds of swine, one 
belonging to the commune and the other to the priory of 
Saint-Marcel-le-Jeussey were feeding together near that 
town, three sows of the communal herd, excited and 
enraged by the squealing of one of the porklings, rushed 
upon Perrinot Muet, the son of the swinekeeper, and before 
his father could come to his rescue, threw him to the 
ground and so severely injured him that he died soon 
afterwards. The three sows, after due process of law, were 
condemned to death; and as both the herds had hastened to 
the scene of the murder and by their cries and aggressive 
actions showed that they approved of the assault, and were 
                                                        
36
 Katie Sykes, Human Drama, Animal Trials: What the Medieval Animal Trials can Teach Us About 
Justice for Animals, 17 Animal L. 273, 276 (2011) 
37
 Id.   
38
 Id. at 276-277.  It is important to note that, as Sykes describes,  “Modern animal law scholars tend to 
mention the animal trials in passing but pay relatively little attention to them, perhaps because (with some 
reason) they see them as mere historical curiosities, artifacts of a superstitious and ritualistic culture with 
little relevance to present-day efforts to ameliorate animal suffering and exploitation.”  However, as Sykes 
persuasively argues, this is because modern theorists have simply deemed the idea too farcical in its 
application, and are consequently willfully ignoring an important part of legal history.  That “legal history” 
demonstrates that at least some societies have long considered animals deserving of legal protections 
similar to or closely related to those accorded to humans.  Moreover, this topic is covered in much greater 
detail below infra part II, section B “Standing.”  
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. at 281. 
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ready and even eager to become participes criminis, they 
were arrested as accomplices and sentenced by the court to 
suffer the same penalty.
41
 
 
Interestingly, there were at least a few cases in which animals were acquitted, 
demonstrating, at least historically, that it is possible for humans to accord animals 
standing and find in their favor.
42
    
While these trials are a thing of the past, animals have occasionally been named 
as plaintiffs in the United States, and thus these cases provide a window into how animals 
might function in a court system in which they are granted standing.
43
  These trials 
embraced concepts similar to our modern notion of guardianship for the defendant-
animals.  Were great apes to be accorded a limited form of personhood, they would 
require guardians in order to function within our legal framework.
44
 It is certainly 
possible that modern trials would bear at least a bit of resemblance to their forbearers.  
II.  Personhood and Standing 
 
A. Constitutional Personhood 
The United States Constitution does not contain a definition of “person.”45  Yet 
persons are given specific and significant rights in the Constitution, particularly in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
46
 Consequently, it is important to consider whether or not apes 
meet a general conception of personhood in order to determine their eligibility for 
enfranchisement.  
                                                        
41
 Evans supra note 6 at 310. 
42
 Id. at 150-151 A donkey was acquitted of bestiality charges after villagers came forth to attest to her 
good character.   
43
 N. Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991). A spotted owl was named as a plaintiff 
in this case.  However, this has proved aberrational and is not precedential. 
44
 David Favre, Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal System, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 1021, 
1037-1038 (2010). 
45
 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 15-3, at 1308 (2d ed. 1988). 
46
 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 2. 
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Significantly, apes display a greater ability to communicate through language than 
some cognitively disabled humans.
47
 In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court found 
that a severely disabled man was guaranteed physical and mental protection under the 
Due Process Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment.
48
  In language stunningly applicable to the 
dire conditions faced by chimpanzees subject to testing, the Court held that   
respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests 
in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably 
nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as 
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of 
confinement would comport fully with the purpose of 
respondent's commitment. In determining whether the State 
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by 
the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of 
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable 
institutions of this type -- often, unfortunately, 
overcrowded and understaffed -- to continue to function.
49
 
 
Notably, the Supreme Court has also distinguished between “artificial” and 
“natural” persons, holding that artificial persons do not enjoy the full breadth of rights 
bestowed upon natural persons.
50
 In Levy v. Louisiana, the Court listed three criteria for 
natural personhood: humanness, aliveness, and being.
51
  Consequently, it is doubtless that 
being born a human is a key factor in establishing personhood because under current law 
one must either be a natural born human or a legal fiction affirmatively created by 
humans.   Great apes are incapable of meeting any of the currently established, narrow 
definitions of personhood because they are neither natural born persons nor are they 
capable of forming corporations. But it is submitted that primates  may have a much 
stronger claim to “personhood’ than that accorded through the fiction of granting 
                                                        
47
 CHRISTOPH ANSTÖTZ, PROFOUNDLY INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED HUMANS AND APES: A COMPARISON 
supra note 19, at 164-65.  
48
 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324-325 (1982).   
49
 Id.    
50
 Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907). 
51
 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968). 
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enhanced status to inanimate corporations. 
Any discussion of the meaning of personhood leads to deep moral and 
philosophical groundings to the issue of personhood that are, frankly, largely beyond the 
scope of this paper.  However, this paper argues that great apes have demonstrated 
sufficient cognition and self-awareness to merit legal recognition and enfranchisement 
through a more limited form of personhood.  Importantly, the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of the cognitively disabled demonstrates its willingness to recognize a form 
of personhood with limited rights.  Therefore, it is asserted that the cognitive capacity of 
great apes, in addition to their significant biological and cultural similarities to humans, 
ought to merit legal recognition in preservation of their inherent self-interest.  
One potential strategy of advocates of such rights, as outlined by Lee Hall and 
Anthony John Waters, would be to pursue impact litigation and attempt to force the 
Supreme Court to recognize Great Ape personhood.
52
   However, this path is likely to be 
fraught with initial difficulty because of the standing barrier preventing great apes from 
asserting claims due to their present lack of personhood under the Supreme Court’s 
current, rather narrow jurisprudence.  
B. Standing  
A major problem facing animal rights advocates has been the issue of achieving 
standing in court.  Standing with respect to the United States Constitution is conferred 
under Article III.
53
  Article III limits standing before federal courts to “cases” or 
“controversies.”54 Under Baker v. Carr,  the Supreme Court held that litigants must have 
                                                        
52
 Hall supra note 1 at 1. The authors created a model brief for impact litigation that would seek to assert 
standing for a fictitious plaintiff gorilla named Evelyn Hart. 
53
 U.S. Const. art. III, 2, cl. 1. 
54
 Id. 
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"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete 
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional issues." 
55
   
To illustrate, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, certain wildlife organizations sought 
to challenge regulations issued by the Secretaries of the Interior and Commerce.
56
  In 
rejecting the challenge, the Supreme Court held that there are “three irreducible elements” 
of standing.
57
  
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -- an invasion 
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized 
and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or ‘hypothetical [.]'" 
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of -- the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to 
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the 
independent action of some third party not before the court."
 
 Third, it 
must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury 
will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
 58
 
 
Furthermore, plaintiffs were required to support each element of standing with the 
“manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation."59    
 In a prior case, Sierra Club v. Morton, the Sierra Club had sought standing for its 
organization to prevent a development from being constructed.
60
  Although the challenge 
was rebuffed, the Court in Lujan construed Sierra to hold that “the desire to use or 
observe an animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable 
interest for purpose of  standing.“61  However, under Sierra, plaintiff must have more 
                                                        
55
 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
56
 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). 
57
 Id. at 560. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. at 561. 
60
 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 730 (1972).  
61
 Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 at 562-563.  
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than a “mere interest” in a problem to assert a third party interest.62 Thus, Sierra stands 
for the proposition that under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, “a mere ‘interest 
in a problem,’ no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the 
organization is in evaluating the problem, is not in itself sufficient, to render the 
organization ‘adversely affected’ or "aggrieved.’” 63 
There are also prudential requirements involved with standing, which the 
Supreme Court has indicated “can be modified or abrogated by Congress.”64 Prudential 
requirements necessitate that the “plaintiff's grievance must arguably fall within the zone 
of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee 
invoked in the suit.”65   Furthermore, “that injury [must] not be widely generalized; that is, 
it must not be shared by all or most citizens” in order to be cognizable.66  
As a consequence of these rules, citizen-suit provisions on behalf of animals at the 
federal level seem unlikely to gain traction, at least in the near future.  Thus, they will 
likely be circumscribed to such an extent as to greatly limit the potential universe of 
plaintiffs who would advance the cause of great apes.  
III.  Great Apes and the Federal Government 
The federal government of the United States has taken some steps to ensure 
protectionist rights of Great Apes through the passage of such legislation as the CHIMP 
Act.
67
  Moreover, in late 2011, the National Institute of Health (NIH) suspended all 
                                                        
62
 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739.  
63
 Id.  
64
 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). 
65
 Id. 
66
 Cass Sunstein A Tribute To Kenneth L. Karst: Standing For Animals (With Notes On Animal Rights), 47 
UCLA L. Rev. 1333, 1354 (2000). 
67
 Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(a) (2012). 
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grants for chimpanzee research.
68
  However, attempts towards expanding personhood at 
the federal level are likely to be fraught with difficulty.  This follows directly from the 
Supreme Court’s narrow construction of the doctrines of personhood and standing.  
Consequently, it is unlikely that Congress will pass any legislation expanding standing or 
recognizing personhood for great apes. Thus, there is effectively no federal right of action 
available to aggrieved non-human hominids, rendering them devoid of any semblance of 
personhood. 
A. Attempted Relief Under the Endangered Species Act 
 Because animals have no legal personhood and, as a result, only limited legally 
enforceable rights, they cannot typically bring suit on their own behalf, though there may 
be an exception to this under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).69  The ESA aims to 
protect endangered species, and because the chimpanzee is only a “threatened species”, 
opportunities for recourse under the ESA are dubious at best.
70
  However, gorillas, 
bonobos and orangutans are considered endangered.
71
 
 The language of the ESA seems to allow for a broad power by citizens to file suit 
in the name of endangered animals in the event of a “taking.”72  A taking is defined under 
the ESA as “harassment, wounding or causing harm.”73  However, as provided in Baker, 
litigants must have "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure 
                                                        
68
 James Gorman, U.S. Will Not Finance New Research on Chimps, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 15, 2011), 
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that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court 
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional issues." 
74
   
As stated above, under Lujan, the Supreme Court has construed the ESA’s 
citizen-suit provision extremely narrowly.
75
 The Court has explicitly rejected the 
“ ‘animal nexus’ approach, whereby anyone who has an interest in studying or seeing the 
endangered animals anywhere on the globe has standing; and the ‘vocational nexus’ 
approach, under which anyone with a professional interest in such animals can sue.”76  
Moreover, as established in Sierra, the injury-in-fact requirement presents a heavy bar 
towards limiting action on behalf of otherwise interested potential plaintiffs.  Thus, the 
ESA is unlikely to prove a reliable tool in advancing potential great ape litigation. 
B. The Animal Welfare Act  
The Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) is a federal anti-cruelty statute that covers a 
limited variety of animals.
77
  The AWA is enforced by the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”).78    
Following a scandal involving baboon abuse in 1985, the AWA was amended to 
provide special protection to apes.
79
  This demonstrates that Congress appears willing to 
take explicit action taken by the federal government in observance of the unique 
character of non-human hominids. Importantly, the AWA contains a provision 
concerning requiring handlers of primates to preserve the psychological wellbeing of 
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primates, indicative of unique preferential treatment.
80
 Specifically, “dealers, exhibitors, 
and research facilities’ [must] ‘develop, document, and follow’ a plan to promote the 
psychological well-being of primates.”81  Furthermore, plans must also allow for 
“environmental enrichment” and “social grouping.”82  However, the AWA has proven to 
be limited in its application towards great ape rights.
83
 
In International Primate Protection League v. Institute for Behavioral Research, 
Inc., animal rights advocates sought to use the AWA to end abuses towards research 
monkeys in a lab.
84
 Experiments were being conducted on “the capacity of monkeys to 
learn to use a limb after their nerves had been severed.”85  Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged 
that the lab “did not provide the monkeys with sufficient food or water, a sanitary 
environment, or adequate veterinary care.”86 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the AWA did not a encompass “private right of action for 
individuals.”87  Instead, the court held that Congress had already delineated its preferred 
method of enforcement.
88
  Furthermore, relying on Sierra, the court held that “the 
commitment of an organization may enhance its legislative access; it does not, by itself, 
provide entry to a federal court.” 89 
Conversely, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman is sometimes held as 
example of expansive third party standing on behalf of animal rights.  However, as 
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Professor Francione points out, this view is inconsistent with the D.C. circuit court’s 
narrow holding.
90
  In Glickman, the plaintiff Marc Jurnove, a lifelong associate of 
primates, asserted that he had suffered injury from encountering various primates in what 
he thought to be distress.
91
  Jurnove sought standing based on the theory that his aesthetic 
injury made him an interested party.
92
 The court held that plaintiff did meet the standing 
requirements, and noted that “legislative history shows, the AWA anticipated the 
continued monitoring of concerned animal lovers to ensure that the purposes of the Act 
were honored.”93 However, as Professor Francione notes, the holding was “limited only 
to whether the advocate had sufficient standing to challenge the failure of the agency to 
promulgate regulations as required under the Act.”94      
C. The NIH Suspends Research 
As mentioned above,
95
 in late 2011, NIH director Frances Collins announced that 
the NIH would suspend grants towards experimentation and research on chimpanzees.
 96
  
Collins stated that, chimps “as the closest human relatives, deserve ‘special consideration 
and respect’.”97   Moreover, the NIH was accepting recommendations made by the 
Institute of Medicine, “which concluded that most research on chimpanzees was 
unnecessary.”98 The NIH has also put forth new criteria requiring that such 
experimentation be utilized only for “research, [necessary] for human health, and that 
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there be no other way to accomplish it.”99  However, the ban covers only the 612 
chimpanzees available for government research, rather than entire body of 937 research 
chimps because NIH policy only directly affects facilities receiving federal funds.
100
  The 
decision was made in compliance with the CHIMP Act. 
D. Federal Legislative Efforts Dealing Directly with Great Apes 
The Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act 
(“CHIMP”) was passed in 2000 amidst much fanfare.101 The purpose of the CHIMP Act 
was to create a national sanctuary system for chimpanzees that are no longer being used 
for medical research.
102
  “The CHIMP Act was described as ‘fiscally sound legislation 
that will better serve the taxpayers as well as the animals.’ Animal advocates also 
promoted the legislation as cost-efficient.”103   
Moreover, The Great Ape Protection and Cost Savings Act (“GAC”) was recently 
introduced.
104
 As is obvious from the title of GAC, there is a strong cost-control aspect to 
rationale behind the act that is consciously being promoted because less experimentation 
would prove cost less.
105
 Moreover, GAC does not create any right of standing.
106
 While 
the enforcement mechanism of GAC is unclear, it would protect chimpanzees by phasing 
out invasive research, requiring the retirement of chimpanzees to sanctuaries, and 
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prohibiting the breeding of chimpanzees for further invasive research.
107
 
While this may be viewed as promising legislative progress, one must consider 
that both pieces of legislation were written with cost savings in mind.  While this may be  
advantageous for the taxpayer, it is unlikely much comfort to advocates of non-human 
hominid rights that their interests are recognized only when they offer some financial 
incentive.   
E. International Progress Towards Recognizing Animal Personhood 
The Great Ape Project and other, similar organizations, have had significant 
success abroad in broadening the scope of protection afforded to great apes.
108
 Progress 
has been concentrated in post-industrialized nations.
109
 The greatest progress has in the 
UK, Spain, and New Zealand.
110
    
In 1997, the United Kingdom established a ban on chimpanzee research as a 
matter of public policy. 
111
  This was the first national ban on great ape research to be 
enacted.
112
  However, in 2006, the United Kingdom’s Medical Research Council began 
the process of reviewing the ban on research through the release of the “Weatherall 
Report”. 113  In 2011, a further study suggested that non-hominid primate research was 
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justified on a cost-benefit basis, and should only be allowed to go forward because "in 
general, primate research is productive and high-quality” but that “it was actually quite 
difficult to identify grants that had substantial medical benefits."
114
  The findings of the 
report represent a step backwards, for non-human hominid advocates, as they begin to re-
open the door to great ape experimentation. 
In 1999, New Zealand took a major step forward by ratifying its Animal Welfare 
Act.
115
  This landmark legislation bestowed rights upon great apes and created an 
affirmative duty of supportive care and greatly restricted the use abusive research 
techniques.
116
  Specifically, "research, testing, or teaching" requires government approval, 
and can only be granted when the activity benefits the ape in question or the ape’s 
species.
117
  Moreover, the “benefits of the activity must not be outweighed by the harms.” 
118
  The legislation was the result of heavy lobbying by pro-animal welfare groups and 
academics.
119
  This was landmark legislation was so advanced because it represented the 
first national legislative recognition of great ape rights.
120
  In the context of the gradualist 
approach advocated by the Great Ape Project and this paper, this is the kind of “first step” 
which open the door to more expansive enfranchisement of great apes. Following New 
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Zealand’s bold legislation, other countries have expanded recognition of non-human 
hominid rights.   
In a further legislative success, Spain became the first nation to acknowledge 
great ape personhood in 2008.
121
  The lower house of its Parliament passed a non-binding 
resolution granting legal personhood to apes.
122
 The resolution embraced the platform of 
the Great Ape Project, marking a significant victory for the organization.
123
  Compliance 
with the Great Ape Project would have limited use of great apes for entertainment 
purposes, while preserving the existing zoo infrastructure.
124
   It is important to note that 
the Spanish parliament’s actions were preceded by a similar recognition of legal rights to 
great apes by the Spanish province of the Balearic Islands in 2007.
125
  This is emblematic 
of a gradualist approach, as local legislation led to the eventual ascension of an issue to 
the national level. 
 Several additional European countries have made remarkable strides made 
towards adopting constitutional amendments that recognize the general rights of animals, 
even if not NHPs specifically.
126
  For example, in Germany, Section 20(a) of the federal 
constitution has been amended to confer an affirmative duty of decency towards animals 
upon the state.
127
   Moreover, the Swiss Constitution has also been altered to expressly 
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protect animals.
128
    
F. Protectionist State Laws In the United States 
While anti-cruelty laws enacted in all states, none rise to the level of granting 
extensive legal rights to non-human hominids.  Moreover, there is significant variance in 
the protective legislation that has been enacted amongst the states.
129
  Consequently, the 
degree of protection afforded to a great ape is as much a matter of geographical 
happenstance as anything else.  In many states, the law does not more rights to non-
human hominids than it does most other mammals.  
However, Connecticut is one of the few states that explicitly contemplate the 
inclusion of great apes in its adopted anti-cruelty legislation.
130
  The private ownership of  
“gorillas, chimpanzees, or orangutans” is banned under Connecticut law.131  However, 
the state does not have any general citizen-suit provision or enforcement mechanism for 
cruelty towards apes.
132
  Connecticut’s explicit policy is to “conserve, protect, restore and 
enhance any endangered or threatened species and essential habitat.”133  However, the 
state permits experimentation to the extent that it is compliant with federal law.
134
 
Conversely, legislation was recently introduced into the Missouri House of 
Representatives that, if enacted, would prevent recognition of animal personhood.
135
  The 
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bill states that “the laws of this state shall not confer upon any animal a right, privilege, 
or legal status that is equivalent or that exceeds a right, privilege, or legal status as that 
which this state confers by law upon a human being.”136  This language clearly rejects the 
notion of animal personhood, and even the limited personhood advocated by the Great 
Ape Trust and in this paper.  However, this bill is important precisely because it is 
targeted against recognition of animal personhood.  This demonstrates the increasing 
visibility of the cause pioneered by the Great Ape Project.  Importantly, the bill also 
states that “this provision shall not be construed as limiting laws that protect the welfare 
of animals in the state. “137 This draws a distinction between the recognition of animal 
rights and animal welfare.  However, as discussed throughout this paper, animal rights 
and animal welfare are deeply intertwined.   
Interestingly, North Carolina’s anti-cruelty statute recognizes a citizen-suit 
provision on behalf of injured animals.  “A real party in interest as plaintiff shall be held 
to include any person even though the person does not have a possessory or ownership 
right in an animal; a real party in interest as defendant shall include any person who owns 
or has possession of an animal.”138   This provision is very important because it realizes 
the full extent of what ESA-expansion advocates seek.  It is suggested that the North 
Carolina statute be used as a model for sister states to follow.  
IV. Analysis of Existing and Proposed Legislation 
 A. What Won’t Work 
Peter Singer, upon passage of a Spanish resolution accepting the platform of the 
Great Ape Project, remarked, “recognition by a government that it can be wrong to 
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enslave animals is a significant breach in the wall of exclusive moral significance we 
have built around our own species.” 139 This language is similar to the language provided 
for in the ESA. However, this law remains inapplicable to “activities conducted for 
purposes of biomedical research.”140 
It is submitted that animal personhood must necessarily be legislatively 
accomplished in order to be lasting.  This is because legislative accomplishments are 
more difficult to overturn than case law.
141
  While impact litigation may also be a 
worthwhile avenue to pursue, its chances appear murky in light of the United States 
Supreme Court’s narrow jurisprudence.  Moreover, court decisions are less likely to be 
popularly accepted than legislative enactments.
142
  So, while taking a case all the way to 
the United States Supreme Court may seem to some advocates like a silver bullet it is 
best to focus on smaller scale advancements that have less of a chance of misfiring.   
Finally, it is imprudent to rely on the fiat of the NIH’s new ban on research.  This 
is because that ban is mere policy and while it will undoubtedly have a major effect on 
the progression of scientific research in the United States, it remains possible that the 
NIH may, in the future, be persuaded by research that advocates a resumption of testing 
on chimpanzees may regain the upper hand.  In the United Kingdom there is a similar 
controversy about “use” of great apes, in which proponents of research are attempting to 
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scale back barriers against research.
143
 The current NIH policy leaves this window 
open.
144
  At that point, the progress previously made would be undone and the cause of 
great ape personhood would take a step backwards. Conversely, were great ape advocates 
to pursue legislative enactment of their unified platform, they would stand a much greater 
chance of seeing the platform become law and likely with greater acceptance.
145
   
 The Great Ape Project itself embraces and advocates a United Nations declaration 
accepting non-hominid primate personhood.
146
  While this would certainly be impactful, 
there is no guarantee that an aspirational declaration (or even a binding one) would in fact 
be enacted.
147
  Moreover, the machinations of the United Nations are time-consuming 
and capricious such that it may be impractical to commit limited resources to passage of a 
declaration that may well prove non-binding.
148
 These problems are likely to be mirrored 
in any attempt to pass domestic federal legislation. 
While the Great Ape Project may have encountered some success in the lower 
house of Spain’s parliament, the legislation was never enacted.  Moreover, there is no 
reason to believe that similar success would be found in the United States House of 
Representatives or Senate.  The Great Ape Cost Savings and Protection Act has not been 
enacted and even if it were, it still would not have the transformative effect which the 
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Great Ape Project envisions because it lacks the landmark language conferring 
standing.
149
   
 
B. Potential Solutions 
 
From a legal perspective, being accorded standing effectively confers personhood.  
In turn, standing allows for the redress of harms.  Thus, by conferring recognition of 
limited personhood on great apes, such an action would allow for the easier redress of 
injuries.    
  1. Impact Litigation 
Attempts at impact litigation, while not discouraged, will certainly face many 
barriers due to the groundbreaking nature of the issue.
150
  The greatest initial hurdle is 
that animals are not constitutional persons under current legislation and jurisprudence.
151
  
As noted above, there have been several instances in the lower courts in which animals 
have been conferred standing.  Nevertheless, there is little sign that the United States 
Supreme Court is ready to grant a potentially revolutionary expansive reading to standing, 
particularly as it would have a broad impact on many other types of litigation.  Such a 
decision would depart from the generally narrow interpretation of standing the Court has 
recently embraced.  Circumscribing the ESA’s citizen-suit standing provision does not 
easily lead to recognizing the capacity of great apes to bring suit, and thereby necessarily 
expanding massively the universe of potential claimants.  The potential backlash, as well 
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as the near-certain burden of expanded court filings would also likely prove disincentives, 
at least in the near term.  Building off the concept of ripeness,
 152
 it is important to 
develop an issue to the point where it is ready to be embraced by the Court. 
2. States and the Pet Trust 
One potential approach to be considered is a state-by-state litigation advocacy 
program.  Due to the potentially explosive nature of expanding personhood by conferring 
standing on great apes, advocates may be better off steering away from national efforts 
and directing their energy towards statewide efforts.  It is important to note that the 
advances made in New Zealand, Spain, Germany, and Switzerland have all been 
accomplished through parliamentary systems.
153
 Parliamentary systems tend to be more 
conducive to efficient and cooperative governance than presidential systems like the one 
in the United States.
154
  Given the current combative climate in Congress, it is reasonable 
to assume that the potentially explosive issue of granting standing to NHPs would likely 
not get very far.
155
  
States have long enjoyed a reputation as “laboratories of democracy”, showing 
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greater willingness to adopt and experiment with new legislative policies on a state-by-
state basis.
156
   Consequently, it would behoove advocates of great ape personhood to 
concentrate on a state-by-state approach.  The historic role of states as a place for 
legislative experimentation may mean that at least some will be more likely to embrace 
statutes conferring greater rights.
157
 Because states already have diverse, and in some 
cases extremely progressive, anti-cruelty statutes, there is a great deal of precedent for 
states moving towards greater protection of great ape rights.
158
 
 The adoption of the Uniform Trust Act of 2000 (“UTA”) represents a “conceptual 
breakthrough” through recognition of animal personhood.159  As of this writing, pet trusts 
have been adopted in 45 states.
160
 Under the UTA, animals are granted personhood for 
the purposes of enforcing trusts.
161
  Professor David Favre has commented that this 
“demonstrates that there is no inherent limitation of the legal system of the states that 
limits the interests of animals, even though they are still considered property. For the 
narrow purpose of probate and trusts, animals are juristic persons with equal rights before 
the court.”162  This concept could be extended into other areas, so as to expand the rights 
of primates and companion animals.  
 In order for states to properly confer a limited form of personhood upon great 
apes, it is necessary that they adopt a form of guardianship law.  This is essential because 
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it allows for the redress of grievances by the plaintiff ape within our legal framework.  
Guardianship would be modeled after the approach used for children, where “ (1) there is 
a prima facie showing of need within the legal system and (2) the party asking for the 
guardianship is capable of representing the child.”163  Thus, potential non-human hominid 
litigants could be brought to court under a statute that used language modeled loosely 
after the citizen-suit provision of North Carolina’s anti-cruelty statute, and incorporating 
standards akin to typical guardianship language. 
The pet trust, which requires a guardian to be effective, demonstrates the 
synchronicity of this approach.  Through the enactment of pet trusts and the appointment 
of guardians, animals are conferred genuine personhood.  Given the extensive promise 
demonstrated by great apes, it is plausible that they could eventually be treated for 
purposes of litigation in a way similar to children or the cognitively disabled in litigation, 
thereby tremendously expanding the ultimate goal of providing equitable protection of 
non-human hominid self-interest within the framework of our legal system. 
The pet trust is not an ideal vehicle for personhood, but could become a highly 
workable tool in the advance of great ape protection.   Because this approach relies on a 
state level advocacy program, it could be suited to the particular jurisdiction in which it is 
being adopted.  Further, because this proposed advancement would occur on the state 
level, it is reasonable to believe that there could be competition amongst states in 
developing the best model.  Moreover, the pet trust model of personhood still inherently 
acknowledges human primacy, while still allowing for a significant expansion in both the 
legal and cultural prominence of great apes. It appears to be one of the best ways to 
                                                        
163
 Favre supra note 44. 
 30 
advance my proposal of a gradualist approach to improving the rights and recognition of 
non-human hominids. 
C. Analysis of What Might Work 
The previously cited Ninth Circuit Court decision in Glickman raised the hope of 
many animal advocates by seemingly recognizing creating a citizen-suit provision in the 
AWA that allows for suit based on “aesthetic” harm.164  However, as noted above, this 
viewpoint may be too broad an interpretation.
165
  Moreover, this represents a limited view 
of the interests of apes: it accounts for harm to persons without taking into account the 
harm to the animal itself.  The NIH ban, while encouraging for animal rights advocates, 
does not represent a paradigm shift in the recognition of non-human hominid rights. 
Existing federal legislation, while a positive development, has been much too gradual a 
climb.   In order to protect and advance the interests of great apes, it is necessary to create, 
as stated by Cass Sunstein:   
If Congress seeks to give standing to people to protect 
interests relating to the well-being of animals, it must 
comply with the injury-in-fact requirement. That 
requirement is met if a person has a nonspeculative plan to 
visit, study, or see the animals in question. Under the APA, 
the same conclusion follows, with two qualifications: 
Plaintiffs must show that they fall within the zone of 
interests protected by the statute, and they must also show 
that in terms of their interests and concerns, they are 
different from citizens generally.
 166
 
 
Due to their intellectual capacity, non-human hominids should be treated as akin to 
children or cognitively disabled adults under the law.  As Stephen Wise argues “justice 
entitles chimpanzees and bonobos to legal personhood and to the fundamental legal rights 
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of bodily integrity and bodily liberty.” 167 Nevertheless, it is important to remember that 
courts will likely be hesitant to extend personhood to any non-human entity, as it would 
substantially upset present jurisprudence.  However, personhood can be granted without 
extending the full panoply of rights, as seen in the case of children set forth in the trust 
model discussed above.
168
 While there are currently anti-cruelty statutes in every state 
that are broadly applicable,
169
 the creation of citizen-suit provisions which would also 
name animals as plaintiffs would dramatically enhance their standing, both legally and 
culturally.  
It is submitted that the enactment of positive law affirming great interests at the 
state level could and likely would prove transformative. Were New York, California, 
Texas or another large state to recognize the interest of non-human hominids in a new 
and significant fashion, it would provide an opportunity for the national dialogue of 
animal rights to shift away from what is cruel or humane and towards the way in which 
we conceive of sentience and personhood. 
Acknowledging the standing of great apes in court as plaintiffs with the capacity 
to protect their own self-interest would prove transformative for several reasons.  First, 
and most importantly, it would force the legal system to reconsider our understanding of 
“civilization” and the rights accorded thereto.  Faced with considerable research 
indicative of ape society,
170
 Americans would be forced to acknowledge, on at least some 
level, the intelligence of other species and the ramifications of existing patterns of 
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treatment towards those species.  The NIH’s chimpanzee ban, in addition to the non-
binding declaration of the Spanish parliament, can be construed as representing initial 
steps towards recognition of the unique status of great apes.   
Second, and very importantly, great ape recognition is a relatively minimal but 
essentially non-threatening first movement away from absolute anthropocentrism.  
Because great apes are our closest biological relatives, they are a logical first step in 
recognizing the value of other life forms in a way that is nott inherently dependent on 
human interest.
171
  This is the flaw in the Glickman holding: its result is still based on an 
aesthetic harm to a person, rather than the basic harm arising from the situation - the 
blighted condition of the primates.   
There remains concern that an increase in the recognition of great ape rights could 
be a “Trojan horse”, the first step in eventually enabling every creature on earth to have 
its day in court.
172
  However, this is unlikely to be the case due to the exceptional nature 
of non-human hominids, in both intellectual capacity and in their biological similarity to 
humans.  While it is conceivable that the great ape advocacy movement, if ultimately 
successful, could spawn a successor group aimed at extending rights to dolphins or other 
animals with highly developed cognition, that day remains far off. Moreover, any 
subsequent consideration would be informed by whatever standards ultimately constitute 
the consensus opinion towards NHPs.  In my view, the present dilemma facing non-
human hominids is too great for this important conversation to be put aside based on 
abstract fears of what may come subsequently. 
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V. Conclusion 
 Fortunately, it seems as though the purpose of the Great Ape Project is slowly 
being met.  As evidenced by the NIH’s recent decision to limit experimentation, there is 
growing agreement through the industrialized world that most scientific testing on apes 
can be avoided.  Domestically, the very introduction of GAC is indicative of significant 
progress in the national conversation about non-human hominid rights. 
 However, there remains a very long road ahead.  To truly advance the cause of 
animal rights, it is necessary to expand the potential universe of persons by initially 
extending limited personhood to great apes.  This stepping stone approach should be 
primarily focused on state legislative advancements, due to the inherent flexibility of 
state law.  While impact litigation should still be pursued, the primary focus of advocates 
should be towards enacting expansive state level legislation.   The adoption of the “pet 
trust” and its accompanying guardian model offers flexibility at the state level, and 
promotes a conservative approach towards rights expansion. With success will come 
transformation away from anthropocentrism and towards a more equitable legal system 
that recognizes the self-interests of our fellow primates.  
